Optimizely Supply Chain Attack: 178 Sites, One Snippet
What the Optimizely supply chain attack delivered to visitors of 178 websites

For about fourteen hours on 16 November, visitors to roughly 178 organisations’ websites were
served malicious JavaScript from a domain those organisations deliberately trusted. Among them
were Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab and HSBC.

The Optimizely supply chain attack did not touch any of their infrastructure. It rewrote the code a vendor runs on
every one of their pages, and the sites kept serving it with a valid certificate from a host they
had configured themselves.

What this covers:

What the Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Looked Like

Optimizely Web Experimentation works through a JavaScript snippet each customer loads from
cdn.optimizely.com. The snippet contains Optimizely’s code, that customer’s
experiments, and an optional field called Project JavaScript, or projectJS.

Whatever a customer puts in that field runs on every page of their site.

An attacker wrote their own code into the projectJS field of many unrelated
customer projects. Everything else in each snippet stayed identical.

The result was a file still served from Optimizely’s CDN, under Optimizely’s certificate, from a
hostname each affected site had already allowlisted by design. Browser controls that trust a
domain had nothing to object to.

How the Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Reached 178 Sites

Optimizely’s incident report describes an unauthorised party exploiting a vulnerability in the
Web Experimentation account signup flow. They used it to impersonate users and insert code into
customer projects.

Critically, this was not a stolen administrator password. Optimizely states the incident was not
a credentials breach, and that the attacker acted as administrator users without their
credentials.

What the vendor has not explained is how one actor obtained write access to so many unrelated
customer projects. Report URI, which discovered the campaign, says plainly that it does not know
either: a compromised Optimizely system, a credential with cross-customer access, or something
else.

It also confirms this was not cache poisoning, because the CDN served exactly what it was
given.

Optimizely’s own marketing sites were caught too, and the earlier wave of the same campaign ran
through other third-party scripts on unrelated sites from September into mid-November.

What the Payload Did to Visitors

Report URI found three variants of the injected loader. Most were a plain script tag pointing at
1688360.cc/track.js. Some hid the same URL in base64 and assembled it with
atob, so a search for the domain found nothing.

At least one carried the full payload inline and ran it through eval as a fallback
if the domain was blocked.

Once loaded, according to Report URI and Netskope, the script skimmed card numbers entered into
payment forms on the site itself, swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses when a visitor copied
one, and sent cookies and screenshots back to the attacker.

On iPhones and iPads it went further, delivering exploit chains that Netskope identifies as
Coruna and DarkSword, targeting iOS 13 through 18 with an additional chain for iOS 26. The payload
was rebuilt 26 times during the day as features were added.

Two scope limits come from Optimizely directly and both are worth repeating: the injected script
targeted payment information and crypto activity only, and card details entered inside hosted
payment iframes such as Stripe or Adyen were not accessible to it.

Timeline of the Optimizely supply chain attack, 16 November 2026
Fourteen hours between first injection and final removal, on 16 November 2026.

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The Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Timeline

Optimizely’s reconstruction, in UTC on 16 November: the first impersonated user account appeared
at 00:37, and the first malicious code was written to a customer project at 07:51.

Detection came at 13:34. Malicious outbound code was blocked at Cloudflare at 16:06, the flaw
was closed at 16:10, and every impersonated session was terminated with tokens revoked at 16:53.
The last injected code was removed from all affected projects at 22:24.

Report URI’s independent sweep found 186 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets it checked infected at
19:24, and noted one site being cleaned and then re-infected with the obfuscated variant, which
means the attacker still had access during the response.

Why CSP Blunts the Optimizely Supply Chain Attack

Optimizely states that sites with a strong Content Security Policy were protected. That single
sentence is the most useful technical fact in the incident.

A CSP restricts which origins a page may load scripts from and, critically, whether inline
script may execute at all. The payload depended on reaching 1688360.cc, a domain
nobody had allowlisted, and on inline execution in the fallback variant.

Report URI makes the same point from the detection side: their platform would have surfaced the
change because the trusted snippet started loading an untrusted destination, and a policy in
enforcement mode would have stopped key parts of the attack outright rather than merely logging
them.

Optimizely Supply Chain Attack: What Businesses Should Do

Four things, in order of how much they reduce exposure:

  1. Move CSP from report-only to enforcement. A policy that only reports is a
    monitoring improvement, not a control. Start with script-src and the specific
    third-party domains your site genuinely needs.
  2. Inventory every third-party script. Tag managers, analytics, pixels, chat
    widgets, A/B testing and heatmaps all load from someone else’s domain and run in your visitors’
    browsers. Most organisations cannot list them.
  3. Monitor what your pages load. Unexpected changes to trusted JavaScript and
    new outbound destinations are detectable. That is how this was found.
  4. If your site ran an affected snippet, treat it as an incident. Check the
    exposure window against Optimizely, review payment and crypto activity from that period, and
    rotate anything a cookie could have carried.

The pattern is the same one we described in
the Amadeus breach, where the vendor was the story: the organisation that gets hurt
is often not the one that was breached.

If you want a second pair of eyes on what your own site loads,
Book a call with Nextek IT or start with
our guide to cybersecurity services for South Florida businesses.

Every Website Carries This Exposure

The uncomfortable lesson for a small business is that the Optimizely supply chain attack was not enterprise-only.
Almost every ordinary business website in 2026 runs somebody else’s JavaScript: a tag manager, a
scheduling widget, a review collector, a marketing pixel.

Each of those is a vendor with its own vulnerabilities, its own signing keys and its own trust
boundary. None of them need your password to cause you a breach.

What you control is the fence: which domains may execute in your visitors’ browsers, and whether
anyone notices when that set changes. That is a configuration decision, and it costs far less than
the notification letters.

Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Questions

Was this a breach of Optimizely’s customers? Their websites served malicious
code to visitors, but the injection happened in Optimizely’s platform rather than on customer
infrastructure. Optimizely reports no evidence that customer passwords were exposed.

Which Optimizely product was affected? Web Experimentation. Feature
Experimentation, the SDKs and legacy Full Stack were not involved, per the incident report.

How many organisations were affected? Report URI counted 178 organisations
serving malicious JavaScript through the platform, with 186 of 1,611 snippets it sampled infected
at the peak of its sweep.

What did the malware actually do? Skimmed payment card details from site forms,
swapped copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses, harvested cookies and screenshots, and on older
iOS devices delivered exploit kits.

Was card data in Stripe or Adyen reachable? No. Optimizely states that cards
entered in hosted payment iframes were not accessible.

Could a Content Security Policy have stopped it? Optimizely says sites with a
strong CSP were protected, and Report URI says enforcement mode would have blocked key parts of the
chain. Report-only mode would have detected it without stopping it.

Is the attacker still active? Optimizely closed the flaw, revoked the
impersonated sessions and removed all injected code on 16 November. Do not extend that reassurance
to sites where the snippet was re-infected: verify against the exposure window.

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Sources:
Optimizely’s incident report,
the Optimizely status incident,
Report URI’s technical write-up,
Netskope Threat Labs’ analysis and
BleepingComputer.
Timeline and scope limits are Optimizely’s own; the payload detail and the 178-site count are
Report URI’s and Netskope’s.